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The major objectives of this paper are to shed some light on the mechanism that 
generates interregional economic imbalances among communities in rural China.  Central 
to this issue is the development of township and village enterprises (TVEs) because the 
presence of secondary industry is closely associated with the economic welfare of the 
people residing in rural communities.  In rural Jiangsu, for example, spatial disparities 
have become more pronounced over the past two decades.  This fact suggests that the 
influence of initial conditions—historical and geographical advantages of industrial 
frontrunners—has not been erased but rather continues to persist.  This is attributed to a 
variety of factors, including the less efficient use of TVE resources in poor areas, the 
decentralized fiscal system, and agglomeration economies.  In short, the socialist regime of 
self-reliance that still lingers in China’s rural society traps less advanced areas in poverty. 
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WHY TVES HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO 





1.  INTRODUCTION 
The degree of spatial disparity in per capita income in rural China is surprising 
given the country’s strong ideological commitment to equality and its powerful 
redistributional system (Byrd and Gelb 1990).  A sharp contrast is often noted between the 
coastal provinces that have enjoyed high economic growth in recent decades and the 
hinterlands where agriculture is still the main industry (Wang 1990).  But it is also worth 
noting the striking disparities that occur even within provinces and counties.  In reality, the 
nonagricultural sectors of very few rural communities have evolved enough to pull those 
economies out of poverty.  
This study sheds some empirical light on the mechanisms that generate such 
interregional economic imbalance.  Central to this issue is the development of township 
and village enterprises (TVEs)
1 because the presence of rural industry is closely associated 
with the economic welfare of the people residing in rural communities.  Thus, analyzing 
the forces that give rise to economic inequality is nearly equivalent to identifying why 
TVEs have developed in some regions and not in others.   
                                                 
1 TVEs are a general name for nonagricultural enterprises located in rural areas.  They are broadly 
categorized into two groups; one comprises collectively owned enterprise run by township and village 
governments and the other comprises nonpublic enterprise established by farmers solely or jointly after the 
reform and open policy was initiated at the end of 1970s.  This dichotomy, however, has become less valid 
since the early 1990s because collectively owned enterprises have been increasingly privatized as a result of  
the more liberal market environment following Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour” in 1992.   
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This paper will emphasize the dependence of economic development on past agricultural 
accumulation (so-called “past-dependency”), institutional aspects of the socialist regime 
(self-reliance under the decentralized fiscal system), TVE managerial priorities, and the 
economic externalities based on industrial clustering.   
It is traditionally believed that TVEs operate not merely to pursue profits but also 
to provide local people with job opportunities and to fill government coffers.  In a way, 
collectively owned enterprises are not so much independent economic units as subordinate 
factories under the immediate control of local governments.  Some rural economies poorly 
endowed with resources and technology may fail to take off economically because of the 
poor performance of local TVEs or because the social responsibilities assigned to TVEs 
may hinder the growth of TVEs themselves.  In contrast, other economies blessed with 
favorable conditions for rural industrialization may successfully follow a sustainable 
development trajectory led by TVEs.   
 
2.  EMPIRICAL QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The central government of China has regulated farmers’ migratory movement, in 
particular from rural to urban areas, since the late 1950s when the People’s communes 
were established.  Even inside rural areas, the People’s communes prohibited farmers from 
changing their occupations and dwelling places.  Thus China’s rural industrialization was 
characterized by the principle of “leaving the farm but not the community.”  That decision 
to retain rural people in their localities is one of the most dominant factors in explaining 
the huge income difference between urban and rural residents.  But, given the mitigation of 
such restrictions and the dissolution of the People’s commune system, the spatial  
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inequality among rural communities cannot be solely ascribed to the migratory immobility 
of the labor force.  This study examines alternative explanations for widening spatial 
disparities, including historical, institutional, and internal and external economic factors.   
THE CONTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURE AND PAST-DEPENDENCY 
It is well known that collectively owned enterprises categorized into the “southern 
Jiangsu model”
2 were established through capital accumulation of collective activities 
under the guidance of local cadres.  TVEs that started operating before or after the open 
and reform policy as suppliers of farm material and daily necessities successfully moved 
on to industrialization thereafter.  However, rural communities poorly conditioned for 
agricultural production failed to keep abreast with industrial frontrunners.  It is a matter of 
empirical question to what extent the course of economic development depends on the past 
and how the initial conditions are locked into the current contours of the local economy. 
 
THE INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE SOCIALIST REGIME 
Reallocating resources among regions may lessen the significance of historical and 
geographical advantages initially afforded industrial frontrunners and give latecomers a 
chance to catch up.  In this sense, lifting the labor movement restrictions does much to 
narrow the income disparity.  But the capital market is still thinly developed and highly 
segmented in contemporary China.  China’s decentralized fiscal system is also 
accompanied by lack of mobility in fiscal funds and the central government’s inability to 
                                                 
2 What distinguishes the “southern Jiangsu model” from the “Wenzhou and Pearl River model” is the way in 
which they raised initial funds.  Although collectively owned enterprises were not predominant in terms of 
their number, their employees and turnover outstripped those of private enterprises (PEs) during the nascent 
period of TVE development.  The regions where PEs evolved throughout the early reform period are 
confined to Wenzhou in Zhejiang provinces and some limited areas of Fujian and Guangdong provinces.  
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manage macroeconomic policy (Bahl 1998).
3  In addition, so-called advance-deposit 
linkages in which increasing savings deposits in advanced regions are lent on a priority 
basis to the local industry impede the interregional flow of funds, and thereby exacerbate 
financial imbalances (Hioki 1996; Ohashi 2000; Tajima 2000; and Whiting 1999). 
Indeed, the decentralized fiscal system has motivated some regions to promote 
rural industry.
4  But due to the food self-sufficiency scheme, backward regions often have 
no choice but to give priority to agricultural production over enterprise development.
5  
Local governments faced with these constraints unavoidably channel scarce resources 
exclusively to farm production in order to cater to the needs of local people.  Surplus TVE 
funds, if any, go scarcely beyond the administrative boundary because they constitute an 
integral part of maintaining the local bureaucracy.  Thus, it is hypothesized that 
interregional economic imbalances may be ascribed to a failure of resource reallocation 
associated with the socialist regime of self-reliance (Nakagane 1996).  More importantly, 
the need to self-finance the equipment of industrial overhead capital would deprive 
backward regions of the chance to set up rural industry, which in turn exacerbates 
interregional inequalities.  
                                                 
3 Although the decentralized system formally ended with the tax sharing system  put in place after 1994, 
many features of fiscal contracting continue to exist because the central government made allowances for the 
vested interest of local governments. 
4 Lin and Liu (2000) used econometric methods to show that the decentralized fiscal system contributed to 
economic growth, but its impact on interregional imbalances is beyond the scope of their analysis.   
5 The feature of self-sufficiency in rural China has not yet faded away even though the market has been 
liberalized.  Instead it has intensified  since the central government  enacted the rice sack governor’s 
responsibility system in 1995.  That system requires provinces to balance the supply and demand of grain and 
maintain the stability of the grain market.    
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LOCAL CADRES’ POLICY PRIORITY: TVE INVESTMENT AND EMPLOYMENT 
Historically, TVEs were the economic organizations that local cadres used to 
dominate every sphere of property rights.  The cadres were the sole authority in the rural 
community and held great sway over the TVE management, exercised the right of asset 
transfer, and claimed the residual income.  Even since TVEs were privatized, local cadres 
have taken the initiative to boost their local economy because their income, tenure in the 
office, and advancement are closely linked to local economic performance (Oi 1999).  
Nevertheless, local cadres are not just concerned with industrialization in their jurisdiction.  
They also show a serious commitment to other policy goals such as full employment of 
local people and the provision of public goods and services (Rozelle and Bisvert 1994).   
Then comes the question of how local cadres prioritize policy goals in light of TVE 
investment and employment.  The past two decades witnessed the diversion of resources 
away from building social infrastructure in favor of TVE investments that yield short-term 
returns.  Such behavior can be interpreted as the natural consequence in a capital-scarce 
society with a decentralized and self-supporting fiscal system.  But overinvestment in 
TVEs results in the undersupply of public goods and services (including industrial 
overhead capital), which in turn is detrimental to the long-term sustainable growth of 
TVEs.  Furthermore, deceleration of TVE progress is likely to impoverish local 
governments’ coffers because TVEs are the major income earners of rural communities. 
Another point to consider in this context is how local cadres’—as TVEs’ virtual 
owners—decide on the allocation of labor.  It is generally believed that local cadres 
assume social responsibility for guaranteeing job opportunities to local people (Wu, Wang, 
and Xu 1990).  What’s more, they guide factory managers in recruiting local people for  
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TVE jobs and encourage them to hire at least one member from each household for fear of 
uneven income distribution within the community.  By the same token, TVE managers 
cannot dismiss employees without the permission of the cadres, even when the TVE 
suffers from overstaffing.  On the part of employees, those who are conscious of their 
status as nominal owners of collectives take their employment in TVEs for granted (Kung 
1999).  As with overinvestment in TVEs, securing jobs for local people at the expense of 
enterprise profits may undermine the fiscal basis of local governments.  
These points suggest the following hypothesis.  The economic welfare of local 
people depends largely on how local cadres make TVE managerial decisions on 
investment and employment.  The worse TVEs perform in poor areas as a result of 
inefficient allocation of resources, the more severely the income disparity manifests itself.     
 
EXTERNAL ECONOMIES BASED ON INDUSTRIAL CLUSTERING: 
AGGLOMERATION ECONOMIES 
It is hypothesized that agglomeration economies that accrue to individual 
enterprises from their own industrial cluster play a significant role in aggravating 
interregional income disparities in China.  In general, such externalities stem from 
knowledge spillovers, the advantages of thick markets for specialized skills, and the 
backward and forward linkages associated with large local markets (Fujita, Krugman, and 
Venables 1999).    
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However, at least two specific elements strengthen agglomeration economies.
6  One is the 
lack of fiscal transfer among regions associated with the fusion of local governments with 
TVEs.  Another is increasing returns to scale given the indivisibility of industrial overhead 
capital (Jimenez 1995).  These elements translate into a situation in which social 
infrastructure is sufficiently provided for by rural communities where enterprises 
intensively cluster.  Put another way, the indivisibility of overhead capital interacts with 
the immobility of funds for public investment to produce a major obstacle to 
industrialization in backward communities.   
These agglomeration effects can be portrayed as follows.  If the production 
function of enterprises is defined as  
) , , ( n k l f q= ,           (1) 
where n is the number of enterprises in one community, then in the event that  0 > ¶ ¶ n q ,  
economies of agglomeration can be said to exist (Kanemoto 1990). 
 
                                                 
6 See Krugman (1991) and Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) on a mechanism that generates industrial 
clustering.  With regard to economic development, refer to Otsuka and Sonobe (2001).  According to an 
analysis of Krugman, whether enterprises cluster or not depends on economies of scale at the plant level, the 
share of manufacturing in the national economy, and transportation costs.  The objective of his papers is to 
shed some theoretical light on the causes of the regional core-periphery relationship (relying on Murphy, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1989)) that makes increasing returns to scale compatible with a competitive market.  
The existence of nonpecuniary externalities is not considered because of its elusiveness.  On the other hand, 
the reasoning of this paper is based on a hypothesis that the performance of TVEs takes a turn for the better 
when economies of scale with respect to public capital work on them.  Paternostro (1997) reckons that the 
clustering of enterprises facilitates the exhibition of scale economies at the plant level.    
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3.  STUDY AREA AND INTERREGIONAL INEQUALITY 
The empirical studies in this paper draw mostly on county data from Jiangsu 
province.  Jiangsu is located in the eastern coastal region of China and borders on 
Shanghai in the southeast.  The Chang Jiang River partitions the province between 
southern Jiangsu and northern and central Jiangsu.  The total area comprises 102,600 
square kilometers of flat topography and is densely populated with more than 71.2 million.  
Table 1—The decomposition of differences in per capita income between each region 
and the northern rural region, Jiangsu province 
 
    North  Central  South 
  b  
a  Urban  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural 
Income difference (1990)
b   -  2.7  4.8  1.5  4.6  2.5 
                                (1999)  -  3.1  4.4  1.7  5.7  4.2 
Secondary industry/GNP (%)  36.8
c  72  48  136  45  79 
Tertiary industry/GNP (%)  0.98  1  0  0  0  0 
Land productivity of agriculture 
      (yuan/mu)  
2.59
 c  15  30  65  21  18 
SOEs/industrial production (%)  4.85  13  4  -4  5  -6 
Central dummy ( C D )  -171  0  -5  -39  0  0 
South dummy ( S D )  367
 c  0  0  0  11  26 
Urban dummy ( U D )  496  33  14  0  15  0 
Residual   -  -34  9  -58  3  -18 
2 R , Total (%)  0.86  100  100  100  100  100 
     Notes:  The percentage contribution of relevant variables to the income difference can be measured 
     on the basis of the following equation:  





















) 1 or 0 ( residual 1 b b , 
    where Y , and  i X  denote per capita income (yuan) and its explanatory variables, respectively.   
     a b  is the estimated coefficient of the equation above obtained from a regression model. 
     b The difference in income is calculated as the ratio given northern rural as the base case.  





people (as of year-end 1999).  It is blessed with favorable natural conditions that provide 
the base for agriculture, fishery, and livestock farming.  Nevertheless, what most marks 
this province is its mushrooming growth of TVEs—ahead of others—over the past quarter 
century. 
Viewed in this light, Jiangsu is hardly representative of China.  But bringing this 
province into focus has some advantages.  The first important point is that the official 
statistical data on TVEs are available on a county basis, so it is possible to estimate the 
production function for specific years.  Even more important is that the analysis of Jiangsu 
helps explain the whole picture of the spatial economic disparity in rural China.  As will be 
shown later, central and southern Jiangsu are relatively wealthy because of the collectively 
owned enterprises set up there in an earlier period; northern Jiangsu is lagging far behind 
and remains impoverished.  Most important of all is that TVEs in this province, which had 
been established originally as collectively owned enterprises, transformed their ownership 
to private.  The empirical analyses here (apart from cases mentioned otherwise) rely 
exclusively on the Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook.  
Table 1 shows the results of a decomposition analysis of differences in per capita 
income given northern rural Jiangsu as the base case.  For example, the table indicates that 
in 1990 per capita income in the rural south was 2.5 times that of the rural north and that 
secondary industry explains 79 percent of that difference.  In other words, the presence of 
secondary industry is the most important factor in accounting for this regional disparity. 
Secondary industry is even more important in accounting for the per capita income 
difference between the rural central and rural north regions.  Agricultural productivity is  
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also a significant contributor, whereas the presence of tertiary industry and state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) have very little impact.  Unexpectedly, the contribution of regional 
dummy variables is so small as to be cancelled out by a residual for some regions. 
 
4.  METHODS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
THE INITIAL CONDITIONS  
The impact of initial conditions can be illustrated by plotting county level data on 
land productivity (measured as grain output ) in 1980 against the ratio of TVE output to 
rural social output (TVE/RSO) in 1990 (Figure 1).  Land productivity in 1980 is used as a 
surrogate for initial agricultural surpluses while the TVE/RSO ratio in 1990 captures the 
extent to which TVEs have subsequently developed within counties.  A positive correlation 
supports the widespread view that agriculture serves as a resource reservoir for rural 
industrialization.  More generally, this phenomenon corresponds exactly to the “factor  
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Note:  N means north, C means central, and S means south. 
 
contribution” of agriculture to modern sectors (Kuznets 1965 and Mellor 1995).  In 
contrast, there were few if any money transfers from industry to agriculture at the time, 
especially as TVEs were still developing. 
A more careful examination of Figure 1 shows that other ingredients (other than the 
factor contribution) are relevant to industrial breakthrough.  In particular, the TVE/RSO 
ratio in some southern counties (marked by S in the figure) are high at 60–90 percent even 
though they had relatively low land productivity of 0.25–0.30 tons per mu (15 mu = one 
hectare).  Other researchers have suggested the following explanations: a massive inflow 
of skilled labors from Shanghai; the early development of roads, railways, and water 
transportation; the germination of household industry even before the reform period; and  
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the ease of subcontracting with SOEs in the surrounding areas (Murakami, Liu, and 
Otsuka. 1996 and Zhang, Findlay, and Watson 1994). 
Table 2 shows the calculated values of Theil’s index of inequality for some key 
economic variables among Jiangsu’s rural counties.  The distribution of both industrial 
output and budget revenue among counties are highly out of balance compared with 
income and budget expenditures.  A glance at the indexes of per capita fiscal revenue and 
expenditures seemingly shows that fiscal transfers ease the intercounty budgetary 
imbalance.  Yet, that is not necessarily the case because the data do not include the “extra 
budgets” of local governments.
7  More noteworthy is the clear trend of widening inequality 
that emerged between 1990 and 1995, suggesting that the influence of initial conditions 
had not been erased and instead persisted until the mid-1990s. 
 
Table 2—Theil’s inequality indexes for some key economic indicators among rural 
counties 
  1990  1995  1999 
Per capita GDP  0.183  0.334  0.330 
Per capita industrial output   0.428  0.564  0.526 
Per capita budget revenue  0.428  0.488  0.458 
Per capita budget expenditure   0.138  0.263  0.196 
  Source:  Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook (China Statistical Press).  
 
THE INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS: SELF-RELIANCE 
Table 3 shows the fiscal condition and investment in fixed assets of Jiangsu 
province in 1999.  By international standards, the ratio of fiscal budget to gross domestic 
                                                 
7 Before a drastic reform in the tax and fiscal system was undertaken in the mid-1990s, the central 
governments allowed local governments to accrue extra revenue (a so-called “extra budget”) through fees, 
surcharges, retained profits, and other revenues, and gave them discretion to spend it.  Accordingly, they  
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product (GDP) is extremely small in China for every administrative level from the central 
down to township.
8  The table demonstrates that Jiangsu is not exceptional given that the 
percentage of revenue to provincial GDP in 1999 is no more than 8.8 percent—below the 
international standard.  One might quickly conclude that public goods and services are 
extremely undersupplied.
9  However, that would be a faulty observation because the extra 
budget, mostly composed of enterprise remittances, covers the costs of public works.  
This two-tier fiscal system (the formal budget and the extra budget) contributed to 
interregional fiscal imbalances because—until the drastic reform of the tax and fiscal 
system in 1994—the extra budget was at the disposal of local governments.
10  In addition, 
even rural counties that are fiscally destitute generally do not receive fiscal subsidies (see 
Table 3).  Under these circumstances, the important questions are: how do rural 
communities finance industrial infrastructure for TVE development, and to what purposes 
are fiscal transfers directed? 
                                                                                                                                                    
became all the more interested in the promotion of local industry for their fiscal interests. 
8 According to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, in 1997, the average ratio of a central 
government’s revenue to the national GDP  was 10.1 percent and 21.5 percent for low-income and lower-
middle-income countries, respectively.    China’s  ratio is no more than 5.8 percent.  In the era of the 
administration of Mao Zedong fiscal money under the extremely centralized fiscal system financed most 
capital related to economic activities (Lin and Liu 2000).  
9 According to the Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook 2000, around 60 percent of investment in fixed capital is 
financed by owned capital, followed by domestic loans (15 percent).  The fiscal coverage is only 2.3 percent.  
10 The State Council “decreed that all extra-budgetary funds are public fiscal revenue subject to state control 
and are not proprietary resources to be used at the discretion of local governments or agencies” in 1996 
(Whiting 2001).  In spite of that local governments  are levying  another “extra-budget”  termed 
“comprehensive fee” on local enterprises.  
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Table 3—Fiscal condition and investment in 1999 (billion yuan) 




Total revenue   68.0  61.6  28.6 
Total expenditure   52.9  39.2  20.8 
  Capital construction  3.8  1.9  0.3 
  Farming and rural water conservation  3.5  1.5  0.9 
  Science, education, culture, and health care  15.4  8.3  6.0 
  Other   30.1  27.5  13.5 
Total investment in fixed assets  274.3  -  - 
  Capital construction  74.9  -  - 
    By state-owned units  64.3  -  - 
  Real estate development   33.1  -  - 
    By state-owned units    17.2  -  - 
  Rural collective   48.2  -  - 
    By state-owned units   0.0  -  - 
Provincial GDP   769.8  -  - 
    Source:  Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook.  
    Note:  State-owned units encompass the government sector.  
 
 
To begin with, it is assumed that local cadres, as representatives of local people, 
allocate the formal budget expenditure (E) to maximize their utility:  
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s.t.
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3 2 1
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,    (2) 
where  j I ,  ) 3 , 2 , 1 ( = j I j , denote investments in agriculture, capital construction, and 
social welfare (such as science, education, culture, and health care), respectively, beyond 
required minimum investments  j I , (or RMI), in each of these items, and  S  denotes non-
investment expenditures, such as subsidy grants, officers’ salaries, and the like.  By solving 
equation (2), we have 
) , , ; 3 , 2 , 1 , , (
) 1 (
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S ] )[ 1 (
1
3 2 1 3 2 1
3 2 1
+ + - - -
- - - - =
a a a
a a a .     (4) 
The sign of  dE E I d i ) (  depends on the “policy preference ( i a )” of local cadres 
and the relative magnitude of the RMI.  On the other hand, we always have  0 ) ( > E E S d  
(or equivalently,  0 ] ) ( [ 3 2 1 < + + dE E I I I d ), meaning that the share of ordinary 
expenditure (total investment) rises (declines) with the fiscal budget size.  The subsidy 
rate, measured by the ratio of fiscal grant (revenue minus expenditure) to fiscal 
expenditure, is included in the equations as an additional explanatory variable to capture 
the impact of fiscal transfers. 
Assuming that both the policy preference parameters and the RMI per capita are 
constant across observations, equations (3) and (4) were estimated with  E (on a per capita   
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Table 4—Estimation results for the expenditure share equations   
    Subsidy  Dummy 
   
Intercept  E 1  
Rate  Central  South  City 
2 R  
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(1.4)  0.53 
Source:  Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook. 
Note. Figures in parentheses are t-values.  
 
 
basis) and the subsidy rate specified as explanatory variables.  Given the estimated 
parameters, the value of  ) 3 , 2 , 1 ( = j I j  was calculated. As the sum of the share of 
expenditures is necessarily equal to unity, Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression method 
was employed with this restriction imposed on the parameters.  The model was estimated 
using the county data of Jiangsu province for 1990, 1995, and 1999.  Since the county data  
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do not include the extra-budget items, then negative values of  j I  likely correspond to 
situations where the extra-budget covers the RMI for some items.   
Table 4 shows the estimation results for the share equations.  A general observation 
is that poor counties are inclined to dispense most of their fiscal money on projects that are 
irrelevant to industrial promotion.  Moreover, fiscal transfers are directed to agricultural 
investment and capital construction, but they are not sufficiently large to improve the fiscal 
imbalance.  As is evident from Table 5, the formal budget mainly covers the costs of social 
welfare, while the extra-budget covers the RMI of capital construction and agriculture.  
The fact that extra-budget revenues finance investments in industrial infrastructure has a 
negative impact on the interregional disparity of TVE development because there are few 
if any extra-budget sources of revenue in poor areas for the local authorities to exploit. 
Table 5—Estimated required minimum investment (yuan per head) 
 
  1990  1995  1999 
Agriculture  -3.0 ~ 1.4  -0.2 ~ 2.6  -6.8 ~ -1.7 
Capital construction  -5.9 ~ -0.6  -6.2 ~ -3.1  -18.4 ~ -12.0 




TVE MANAGERIAL DECISIONMAKING  
 
Investment 
In order to test whether TVEs are managed in economically efficient ways, we 
derive an investment function based on the stock price maximization principle and 
formulate the enterprise growth function, drawing on Aoki and Itami (1985).    
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Suppose that TVE profit is given by  
wl n k l pf - = ) , , ( p . 
It is tenable to look on product price ( p ) as given to every TVE manager, while the 
determination of the wage rate ( w) will be discussed later.  Suppose further that  x 100  
percent of the profit has to be invested every period for the enterprise to grow at rate  g .  
The enterprise growth function is assumed to meet the conditions (Uzawa 1969):  
i g g g g < = < > ) 1 ( and , 0 ) 0 ( , 0 " , 0 ' , 
where i denotes the interest rate.  The value of the enterprise (the stock price) is defined as 
the discounted present value of net cash flows:  
g i
x








] ) 1 [(
0 0 . 
For collectively owned enterprises, local government is the claimant of dividends.  
The condition that maximizes the value of the enterprise (discounted present value of fiscal 








' .          (5) 
County data on enterprise investment was used to calculate annual average changes 
in the gross capital stock between 1990 and 1993 and the following TVE growth function 
was estimated by regression analysis:  
57 . 0
288 . 0 301 . 0 121 . 0 ln 307 . 0 958 . 0 ln
2
) 7 . 3 ( ) 0 . 5 ( ) 9 . 1 ( ) 8 . 4 ( ) 0 . 15 (
=
- + + + - =
- -
R
D D D x g U S C
.   (6)  
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The figures in parentheses are t-ratios.  The coefficient estimates of the dummy variables 
are based on using the northern rural areas as the base case (see Table 1 for definition of 
the dummy variables).  The coefficients suggest that enterprises located in central and 
southern Jiangsu grow faster than those in the northern region given the same investment 
rate.  This cannot be overemphasized because these results—combined with the previous 
finding that the presence of secondary industry is responsible for per capita income 
differences—explain much of the widening interregional imbalances led by TVEs. 
Solving equation (5) using the estimated parameters of equation (6) gives the 
equilibrium rates of investment and enterprise growth.  Table 6 shows that the two rates 
are far higher in advanced regions than in less advanced ones.  It also shows that the actual 
investment rate is far greater than the equilibrium value for all observations.  Most 
noteworthy is that such a tendency is all the more pronounced for less advanced regions.  
This phenomenon may mirror local cadres’ strategy in poor areas of prioritizing enterprise 
growth to keep up with industrial frontrunners.  But as previously mentioned, 
overinvestment in TVEs always undermines the local fiscal position because if the 
investment rate does not meet equation (5), it vitiates the discounted present value of fiscal 
revenue
11. 
                                                 
11 To be precise, overinvestment in TVEs does not necessarily mean underinvestment in public works.  In 
order to know whether an additional public investment is necessary, the rate of returns has to be estimated.     
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Table 6—The equilibrium of investment and growth rates 
 
  Northern  Central  Southern 
) 1 ( g   0.38  0.43  0.52 
x  0.47  0.49  0.67 
) (x g   0.30  0.35  0.46 
* x   0.18  0.24  0.49 
) (
* x g   0.22  0.28  0.42 
 
Employment  
The labor customs that linger in rural China are a legacy of the People’s commune 
system.  Suppose that only TVEs and agriculture provide employment opportunities for 
local people in rural areas.  Further let N  and  ￿ = ) ( l L  be the number of the potential 
labor force and the total employment of TVEs in one community, respectively.  Thus 
L N -  are self-employed by agriculture.  Those who get a job in TVEs with probability 
N L  are paid at wage rate  w, otherwise they earn  ) ( ~ w w <  from farming.  Their expected 
utility is defined as follows:  











￿ - + ” . 
Now consider the case in which the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) (Nash 1950) 
determines the wage rate and the aggregate employment level of TVEs.  Local cadres solve 
the following problem:  




- - ” Y p p .      (7)  
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where p ~ denotes enterprise profit obtained from the outside option.  On the other hand, 
since those who have rural family registration are entitled to contracted farmland, it is 
entirely reasonable to look on earnings from agriculture as their outside option.  Local 
people have no opportunity to represent their interest in the TVE management because 
local cadres are unilateral decisionmakers.  Yet local cadres’ egalitarianism and inclination 
to favor local people would attach to TVEs some characteristics reminiscent of cooperative 
firms.   
Provided that utility is a linear function of wage income, the solutions to equation 















,         (8) 


















,        (9) 
where  F  stands for the aggregated production function of the enterprises.  It is obvious 
from equations (8) and (9) that so long as  w w< ~  then the equilibrium labor input given by 
the NBS is always larger than the counterpart that the profit maximization principle 
dictates.   
The production function represented by equation (1) is specified for TVEs as the 
following flexible trans-log form: 
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(See Table 1 for definition of the dummy variables.)  If the relative share of labor is 
denoted by  ) ( q p wl = l , equations (8) and (9) reduce to:  
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These can be represented by the following two equations: 
l e e l ~
2 1+ = , 
l n k LL Ln LK L ln ' ln ' ln ' ' b b b a l + + + = . 
If the determination of labor input and the wage rate follows the NBS model, then 
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' 2 LK LK b b = ,  ' 2 Ln Ln b b = , and  ' 2 LL LL b b = , 
On the other hand, if producers maximize profit with respect to labor input as price-takers, 
then the hypothesis is: 
H2:  ' L L a a = ,  ' LK LK b b = ,  ' Ln Ln b b = , and  ' LL LL b b = .  
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A simultaneous estimation of the production function and labor share equation can 
be used to test the null hypotheses, with output, labor input, and the wage rate regarded as 
endogenous variables.  The source of data is the Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook.  The labor 
input is measured as total employment, while capital input is measured as gross fixed 
assets at constant prices.  The null hypothesis of H1 was rejected by the Wald’s Chi-square 
test at the 1-percent significance level, while H2 was not rejected even at the 5-percent 
significance level.  Table 7 shows the estimated results.  
  
Table 7—Estimated results for the production functions 
 
  (a)  (b)    (a)  (b) 
Equation 10          Equation 11       
L a   0.387  (45.7)  0.386  (45.0)  1 e   0.437  (33.4)  - 
K a   0.594  (28.2)  0.593  (27.0)  2 e   -0.380  (-4.4)  - 
n a   0.080  (3.3)  0.092  (3.8)  2 R   0.23  - 
Equation 12       
LK b   -1.015  (-2.3)  -0.099  (-7.2) 
' L a   0.396  (4.5)  - 
Ln b   0.003  (0.0)  -0.008  (-1.5)  ' LK b   -0.081  (-6.0)  - 
Kn b   -0.015  (-0.1)  -0.013  (-0.3)  ' Kn b   -0.001  (-1.5)  - 
LL b   1.379  (2.0)  0.155  (7.3)  ' LL b   0.126  (5.9)  - 
KK b   0.773  (2.7)  0.114  (2.6)  2 R   0.25  - 
nn b   -0.060  (-0.9)  -0.061  (-1.0)         
C b   0.125  (4.6)  0.112  (4.1)         
S b   0.168  (6.0)  0.154  (5.8)         
U b   0.035  (1.2)  0.022  (0.8)         
2 R   0.96  0.95         
    Note:  Figures in parentheses are t-values.  In model (b), the parameter restrictions of H2 are imposed, 




The columns (a) and (b) in the table correspond to the results without and with the 
parameter restrictions represented by H2, respectively.  Based on the results of (b), the 
MPL (marginal value product of labor) was estimated.  Its mean value weighted by the 
relative quantity is approximately equal to the wage rate for TVEs.  Thus it can be 
concluded that TVEs, on average, determine their labor input in such a way as to maximize 
their profits.
12   
Yet a closer look at the estimated results reveals regional variations.  Regressing 
the surplus rate of agricultural labor
13 on the MPL of TVEs over the wage rate ( w MPL ) 
leads to the following result: 
23 . 0
074 . 0 052 . 0 162 . 0 247 . 0 034 . 1 MPL
2
) 2 . 1 ( ) 9 . 1 ( ) 2 . 3 ( ) 0 . 2 ( ) 0 . 6 (
=
+ + + - =
-
R
D D D surplus w U S C
, 
where  1 = surplus  means 100 percent.  The average value of the surplus rate for Jiangsu 
province is 0.427, while it is 0.478 for northern Jiangsu and 0.376 for the rest of the 
province.  This result indicates that a rise in the surplus rate makes it more likely that 
TVEs are overstaffed.  More importantly, judging from the estimated parameters of the 
dummy variables, TVEs in northern rural counties hire surplus labor beyond the optimal 
point, no matter what the agricultural labor condition.  Thus, TVEs’ adherence to the 
traditional labor custom, which prevails especially in poor communities, challenges TVE 
productive efficiency.  And, as is the case with over-investment in TVEs, violating profit 
maximization undermines the fiscal condition of local government.   
                                                 
12 Although this result disagrees with Gregory and Meng (1995) and Weizman and Xu (1994), it agrees with 
Murakami, Liu, and Otsuka (1996) and Hondai and Luo (1999). 




AGGLOMERATION ECONOMIES  
TVEs exhibit economies of agglomeration ( 0 > ¶ ¶ n q ).  That is, an individual 
TVE turns a geographical concentration of its own enterprises (an industrial cluster) to its 
advantage.  The effect of these economic externalities can be stated quantitatively.  The 
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Table 8—The measurement of agglomeration economies 
 
  # of firms   w MPL   Original p   Normal p   ) ( n f p ¶ ¶  
Basic enterprises  235  0.87  62  64  80 
200–400  319  0.94  141  146  111 
400–600  478  1.02  275  285  97 
600–800  714  1.05  404  417  69 
800–1,000  849  1.24  562  597  62 
1,000–  1,281  1.02  418  420  26 
  200–400  400–600  600–800  800–1,000  1,000– 
p d    82  221  353  533  356 
qdp  28  82  120  257  113 
ldw  -13  -34  -55  -68  -72 
dk k f p ) ( ¶ ¶   60  152  253  300  261 
dn n f p ) ( ¶ ¶   7  22  35  44  54 
p d dn n f p ) ( ¶ ¶  (%)  8.8  9.8  10.0  8.2  15.1 
  Note:  Profits and  ) ( n f p ¶ ¶  are measured in thousand yuan and yuan, respectively.   
 
 
Table 8 lists the results of a decomposition analysis that breaks  p d  into various 
factors given a county where enterprises cluster least as the base case.
14   
                                                 
14 The decomposition is carried out after estimating  p d  and labor input that meets the marginal product  
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Not surprisingly, the contribution of dk  is among the largest.  Because the wage rate is 
higher in areas where enterprises cluster, dw helps decrease the regional differences in 
profit.  Given a lack of data, qdp is estimated as a residual.  The percentage contribution 
of  dn n f p ) ( ¶ ¶  to  p d  increases with industrial clustering with the exception of the 
second largest category and reaches 15.1 percent for the largest one.  It follows that TVEs 
located in industrial counties get more economic benefits than those in backward region.  
In other words, TVEs in poor areas are less able to exploit such externalities because of 
their own small cluster. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
Inter-regional income disparities have widened in recent decades in rural China, 
including between rural areas within the same province.  The rapid growth of TVEs has 
been an important contributing factor, and this study has identified and shed some 
empirical light on the underlying reasons in Jiangsu province.  These factors include a) the 
initial impact of agroclimatic and locational conditions on agricultural growth, b) the less 
efficient use of TVE resources in poor areas because of greater concern with local 
employment problems, c) the decentralized fiscal system that requires local governments 
to generate most of their own fiscal revenue, and d) externalities associated with 
agglomeration economies.   
The reallocation of resources in pursuit of positive profit is likely to lessen the 
significance of the initial conditions for economic development.  It should also pave the 
                                                                                                                                                    
principle.  Thus, the term of  dl w l f p ) ( - ¶ ¶  is equal to zero.  The adjusted profit is termed the normal  
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way for less advanced regions to catch up with industrial frontrunners.  But in fact, TVEs 
located in advanced areas are superior to those in less advanced areas in terms of 
investment efficiency and enterprise growth rates.  Over the past two decades in rural 
Jiangsu, instead of narrowing, regional imbalances have become more pronounced.  
TVEs located in poor areas are shouldering far more responsibilities than those in 
rich areas because they are providing local people with job opportunities at the expense of 
profit maximization.  In addition, local cadres in less advanced areas are shortsightedly 
overinvesting in TVEs.  Such behavior leads to less efficient use of capital and labor and 
reduces the performance of TVEs.  Reduced profits in turn limit the ability of local 
governments to invest in infrastructure and public services since under the decentralized 
fiscal system in China they depend on TVE profits to finance most of their expenditures.  
Reduced investment in public goods in turn contributes to slower long run growth in 
TVEs. 
The institutional aspects affecting interregional economic imbalances cannot be 
overlooked.  The socialist regime of self-reliance (the decentralized fiscal system) 
reinforces a positive relationship between enterprise growth and the provision of industrial 
infrastructure in economically advanced areas.  In contrast, that causality traps less 
advanced areas in a vicious circle of poor enterprise growth and inadequate industrial 
infrastructure.  Thus increasing returns to scale concerning industrial overhead, the 
decentralized fiscal system, and the fusion of governments with enterprises all interact to 
produce agglomeration economies.
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